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Abstract  
Based on matched employer-employee data from Norway, we analyze the effects of worker 
displacement in 1986-1987 on their children’s earnings in 1999-2001. Using displacement of 
fathers to indicate an exogenous earnings shock we seek to identify whether family resources 
have a direct effect on children’s economic outcome. As in previous Scandinavian studies, we 
find the intergenerational earnings mobility to be fairly high compared to the U.S. and the 
U.K. Displacement appears to have a negative effect on earnings and employment of those 
affected, while we find no significant effects on offspring. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is well established that the economic success of children is to some extent related to the 
incomes of their parents, see Solon (1999) for an overview. The positive correlation between 
parents’ and children’s earnings is consistent with a model where utility-maximizing families 
invest a part of their income in the human capital of children; see Becker and Tomes (1979, 
1986). Even so, it may be argued that the mechanisms behind intergenerational mobility (or 
lack of such) are not fully understood. One argument is that conventional intergenerational 
earnings elasticities confound several deeper parameters. For instance, Goldberger (1989) 
notes that the empirical observation of father-child correlations may also be explained without 
appealing to utility maximization: “..suppose that intergenerational links are stronger for 
occupation or socioeconomic status than for income or earnings. Then restricting attention to 
the monetary measures could lead an economist to understate the influence of family 
background on inequality.” Also recent empirical contributions to the literature aspire to 
disentangle mechanisms behind the intergenerational earnings correlation. Grawe (2004) 
notes that observed non-linearities in intergenerational earnings correlations do not 
necessarily support the credit constraints that seem necessary for the story of earnings 
transmission through investment in education, but rather low market ability and low 
preferences for education etc. being passed on from their parents to their children.  
 Oreopolous et al. (2005) also note that income differences might be result of parental 
income differences leading to differences in monetary investments in children or, just as 
likely, a reflection of the passing on of parental characteristics. They go on to argue that 
comparing outcomes of children from families with different income levels may overstate the 
importance of economic resources, as high income parents also may have high motivation and 
ability that affect outcomes of the next generation. Their approach is to use firm closures in 
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Canada to indicate exogenous income shocks. They find that worker displacement has 
detrimental effects on children’s labour market outcomes. This finding is taken as evidence 
that, indeed, family income is an important factor in determining the economic outcome of the 
children. 
 Huttunen et al. (2006), using the same Norwegian data source as in the present study, 
find that worker displacement has negative effects, but mainly through employment effects. 
Rege et al. (2005) find that plant downsizing substantially increases permanent withdrawal 
from the labour force by increasing the disability entry rate of workers in the affected plants. 
Despite of the potential importance of displacement for children’s outcomes, there are very 
few studies on the topic. The present paper tries to close this knowledge gap. Applying a 
similar approach as Oreopolous et al. (2005) we investigate whether their conclusions hold 
confronted with a large sample of Norwegian father-child pairs. Our data includes earnings 
information for fathers from the period 1982-1985 and for the children from the period 1999-
2001 when they are at age 26-30, together with relevant plant level information.  
Previous research has found lower intergenerational earnings correlations in non-
Anglo-Saxon Europe, in particular Scandinavia, than in the US and UK, see Björklund and 
Jäntti (1997, 2000), Solon (2002), Bratberg et al. (2005, 2007), Bratsberg et al. (2007).1 Even 
though the intergenerational earnings correlations are low in Norway, parental income could 
have a causal effect, albeit small in size. It could also be the case that an employment shock to 
the family affected the cognitive environment of children or youths and thus had a “nurture 
effect” that could show up at a later age. An exogenous income shock would help to identify 
such effects. On the other hand, if no intergenerational effects of a displacement are found, it 
adds to the evidence that the Scandinavian egalitarian welfare model reduces the effects of 
family background and potential credit constraints that seem to be more important in North 
                                                 
1 The analysis by Oreopolous et al. (2005) using Canadian data finds correlations closer to European results. This 
fact they attribute to their conditioning on stable workers before firm closings. 
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America. We do not find any statistically significant effect of fathers’ displacement on the 
intergenerational earnings correlation.  
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical strategy. 
Section 3 describes the data used. The results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 
offers some concluding remarks.   
 
2. Empirical approach 
 
The common approach in studies of intergenerational income mobility is to run a regression 
of some measure of the young generation’s earnings on a measure of their parents’ earnings. 
The interpretation is that the stronger the effect of parent earnings is, the less is the 
intergenerational mobility. The earnings measures are meant to be approximations of lifetime 
income, and the underlying economic model is often thought of as utility-maximizing families 
that invest parents’ earnings in children’s human capital. Estimating a relationship that is 
clearly related to such an underlying model is not straight-forward, however. First, the young 
generation’s outcome is not related to investment in education, but also to unobservable 
endowments (‘nature and nurture’), in addition to random shocks. Second, in practice only a 
few years of earnings are available. When income from one or a few periods is interpreted as 
a measure of permanent income, a classical error in variables problem arises because each 
period contains random variation around the permanent part, causing attenuation bias. From 
the early nineties, following the work of Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992), much 
attention has been focused on how to alleviate this bias, typically by using income averages 
over several years or instrumental variables. Third, even if these problems were solved, the 
parent-child regression is a reduced form, and a positive correlation does not necessarily have 
a causal interpretation. As noted in the introduction, the focus in this paper is on the latter 
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problem, and we use a shock to family income as a source of exogenous variation to explore 
the effect on the next generation. 
 We proceed in two steps: first we consider the economic effects of displacement for 
those affected. Then, contingent on identifying such effects, we assess the impact on the next 
generation. The idea is that displacement represents an exogenous shock to family economy, 
and if this shock affects the children of those displaced it is evidence that economic resources 
have a direct effect on children’s economic outcome. This empirical strategy follows 
Oreopolous et al. (2005). In the first step, we take advantage of having access to a long 
earnings panel together with a rich set of background characteristics and compare earnings 
trajectories for workers who were displaced to workers who were not. The motivation for 
using displaced workers, and not workers who quit voluntarily or were fired, is to avoid 
selection on unobservable abilities. But this is no guarantee: in downsizing firms the least 
productive workers may have to leave first (or the most productive may leave voluntarily), 
and workers with good alternative job prospects may leave firms where closure threatens. If 
we confuse low worker productivity with a shock to the firm, we may overstate the effects of 
the shock. To reduce this possibility, we pick workers with a stable relationship to the firm. 
Furthermore, we include pre-displacement observations in the analysis. We consider workers 
who were – or were not – displaced in 1986-1987, and use 1982-1994 as our observation 
period. The estimated equation is  
 
(1)   ∑ = ++= 19941982t itittit DY εγα , 
 
where Dit is an indicator of whether displacement took place interacted with year dummies; 
i.e. leads and lags of the displacement dummy. Yit is father’s log earnings, demeaned by first 
regressing log annual earnings on year, age, and industry dummies and using the residual 
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from this regression in equation (1).2 We expect γt to be negative in the years after 
displacement if there is a negative income effect, but if γt is different from zero also in the 
years before displacement, it indicates that the negative effect after displacement may be due 
to selection. OLS and fixed effect (FE) results will be reported. The advantage of FE is that 
time constant unobserved heterogeneity, e.g. differences in worker productivity, is swept out 
of the model.  
An empirical finding in a previous Norwegian study (see Huttunen et al., 2006) is that 
the employment effects of displacement may be more important than the earnings effects. 
Therefore, we also estimate similar equations for non-employment and recorded 
unemployment. However, as we condition on workers with a stable relationship to the firm 
before 1986, these regressions are only for the post-displacement years.  
 In the second step of the analysis, we include a dummy for fathers’ displacement in a 
regression of child earnings on father earnings. It is well known that using single year 
earnings of parents may seriously bias the estimates, see Solon (1992) and Zimmerman 
(1992), thus typically averages over several years are used. We follow that practice. There is 
also a growing understanding that using child outcomes when they are too young may induce 
life cycle bias, see Haider and Solon (2006), Grawe (2006). We then face a trade-off: on the 
one hand we wish the children to be young enough to potentially be affected by a shock to 
family economy and employment; on the other hand we want to avoid observing their own 
labour marker outcomes at a too early stage in their career. But if the life-cycle bias is the 
same for displaced and non-displaced workers, we can still get an unbiased estimate of the 
difference in the intergenerational mobility between the two groups. We estimate the 
following equation, 
 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, the controls could be included in equation (1), but the industry controls would have to be 
dropped in a fixed effect regression. 
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Here, 0199−ciY is average log earnings of the child 1999-2001, 
8582−f
iY  is fathers’ average log 
earnings 1982-1985, and β is the intergenerational earnings elasticity. Di indicates that the 
father was displaced in 1986-87, and Xi is a vector of dummy variables controlling for gender 
and birth cohort of the child, and father’s industry in 1986, before potential displacement. δ 
measures the effect of this childhood shock to the family economy on the next generation as 
young adults. 
 Our data permits us to follow child earnings until 2001. We have chosen to work with 
the 1971-74 cohorts, who were 12-15 in 1986, and observe their earnings in 1999-2001, when 
they were 25-30 years old. The next section explains data in more detail. 
 
3. Data and sample 
 
Our data source is a full population database of matched employer-employee data, constructed 
by merging several administrative registers. The core is individual background information 
for the years 1986-2001, moreover, gross earnings based on tax records are available from 
1967 on.3 For individuals in the labour force, the data contains identifiers that make it 
possible to merge firm information at the plant level. For our purposes, it is convenient that 
this information includes the date a job started. Furthermore, it is possible to link parents and 
children by personal identifiers.4  
 In the present study, we wish to construct a sample of fathers with a stable attachment 
to the labour force, who were susceptible to displacement, with children young enough to be 
                                                 
3 In addition to earned income, the earnings measure includes unemployment insurance, disability benefits, and 
sick pay, but not means tested social assistance. 
4 See Møen et al. (2003) for a closer account of the data. 
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affected by this possible event, and old enough to be observed with earnings in the sample 
period. 1986 is the first year for which we have information on firms, thus we can only 
identify downsizing and closure from 1987 on. These concerns lead us to extract the 
following sample. We include men born 1930-1950, with children born 1971-1974. 
Furthermore, fathers are only included if they have a valid plant identifier in 1986, are 
working full time, have tenure with the plant since at least 1983,5 and if that plant had at least 
five employees. Finally, we have excluded individuals from the petroleum industry because of 
the volatility of the sector, with a multitude of births and deaths of firms compared to the 
other sectors. Moreover, the average wage level in this sector is so high that it would affect 
the average wage level of displaced workers in our analysis.    
 With 1986 as base year we identify plants that have a reduction in their labour stock of 
at least 30% from 1986 to 1987 or closed down. A plant is defined as closed if the plant 
identifier is no longer present in the data.6 Fathers are then classified as displaced if the plant 
has closed down or if the plant downsizes and an individual is no longer with the plant in 
1987. It should be noted that the data are updated yearly by the end of May, thus plants 
downsize or close down between May 31, 1986 and May 31, 1987. Our treatment group 
consists of fathers who were displaced in that period. As noted in the previous section, in the 
father-child regressions, we condition on fathers’ earnings measured as the average of the 
years 1982-85, excluding years with zero earnings.7 We use log earnings in the estimations, 
and the averages are over the logs, i.e. not log of averages The year 1986 is avoided, as the 
plant may have closed down sometime after May 31 in that year.  
                                                 
5 The data contains job start dates, thus we may compute tenure for jobs that started before 1986. 
6 If the plant reappears in later years we consider it a data error and do not classify the plant as closed. Also, if a 
majority of the workers from a disappeared plant show up with the same plant id, we interpret this as 
reorganization and do not count the plant as closed. 
7 Given that we focus on the difference between displaced and non-displaced workers, and assuming that the 
occurrence of zero earnings is distributed randomly between the two groups, the point that the estimated 
intergenerational mobility is sensitive to the selection rule (see Couch and Lillard (1998) and Corak and Heisz 
(1999)) should not affect the estimate of the displacement   
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In addition to earnings effects, we explore the effects of displacement on non-
employment and registered unemployment. Non-employment is defined simply as having no 
valid plant identifier in the current year. Unemployment is months of registered 
unemployment in the current year.8 Obviously, our definition of non-employment 
encompasses individuals who are registered as unemployed, but it also includes individuals 
who are outside the labour force. Furthermore, as our data are updated in the end of May, an 
individual who is classified as non-employed in a given year may have found work later in 
that year. 
 As noted above, we consider average earnings 1999-2001 for children, computed in 
the same way as for fathers. Because children are still of an age – 25-30 – where a certain 
fraction may be undertaking education, we condition on not being in that category. This 
finally gives us a sample of 58,853 father-child pairs. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
The descriptive statistics for fathers in Table 1 are based on data from 1986, which 
was is first year with complete background characteristics for the fathers. Non-displaced 
workers have higher education than those displaced. Earnings are somewhat lower for the two 
treatment groups. However, when we compare with the earnings trajectories in Figure 1 
below, this appears to be a case of “Ashenfelders dip”: there are hardly any sign of earnings 
differences before 1985. The main difference between the samples is the sectors of which they 
are employed. Employees who experience displacement have to a much higher degree their 
background in the manufacturing sector, while the share of public sector employees is more 
than four times as high for the non-displaced compared to the displaced. This reflects two 
                                                 
8 It is necessary to register as unemployed to obtain unemployment benefits. This variable is only available from 
1988. 
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central features of the labour market in the period under study: a massive downsizing of the 
manufacturing sector due to globalisation, outsourcing, etc, and a significant labour protection 
against displacement in the public sector. The descriptives for children show that children of 
displaced workers have less education and lower earnings than children of workers who did 
not offer a job loss. The analysis in the next section will explore whether this earnings 
difference may be attributed to income shocks following their fathers’ displacement in 1986-
87. 
 
4. Results 
 
(Figure 1-3 about here) 
 
We start by inspecting descriptive evidence on the effects of displacements on fathers’ 
outcomes. Figure 1 shows earnings trajectories 1982-1994 of non-displaced and displaced 
workers. We also show separately workers displaced due to closure. The trajectories start out 
quite similar, but displaced workers experience a drop starting in 1986. Earnings of displaced 
workers are slightly below those of the non-displaced in the beginning of the observation 
period. Workers who were displaced because of closure are, on the other hand, more similar 
to non-displaced. The difference is modest – 1991 earnings of displaced workers are about 
7% below 1986 earnings – but it also seems that displacement gives a lasting negative effect 
compared with the rest. In 1994 the earnings difference is about 9%. We also note that the 
trajectories follow the business cycle: a recession started in 1996 which lasted until 1993. 
Average earnings for all groups start to catch up from 1992 for all groups but faster from the 
displaced. One explanation may be that unemployed individuals get jobs and move from 
unemployment benefits into paid work. 
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 Figure 2 shows non-employment shares. As expected, for the displaced this share is 
well above the others in 1987, 45% vs. 3%. The difference decreases, but in 1994 it is still 10 
percentage points and another 4 points for workers from closed plants. The trajectory for non-
displaced workers shows a positive trend which reflects ageing of the sample, leading to a 
larger fraction of retirement. Figure 3, which traces average weeks of unemployment 
(including those with no unemployment), tells a similar story, and again, it is workers from 
closed plants who fare the worst. 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
As we argued in Section 2, there may be systematic selection of workers with low 
earnings capabilities into plants that are in danger of closing down. Therefore, we estimate 
equation (1), which is a regression of yearly earnings 1982-1994 on leads and lags of the 
displacement dummy. We use two versions of the displacement dummy: one for all displaced, 
and one for displaced workers from closed plants. Table 2 reports the results. The OLS results 
for all displaced workers indicate a negative and statistically significant effect of displacement 
for all years after 1987 (period 0 in the table). The negative effect begins in 1986; this is as 
expected because the observation period for plants is May to May. The FE results are similar, 
but with a significant coefficient also in 1985, raising suspicions of pre-displacement 
differences. Turning to workers who were displaced from closing plants, there are no 
significant differences from other workers before 1996, but significant negative effects in the 
years thereafter. The effects last through the observation period, in accordance with the 
descriptive evidence in Figure 1. The effects are modest in size, though, largest in 1991 with -
0.163 (FE), according to a negative effect of 15%. 
 
 11
(Table 3 and 4 about here) 
 
Table 3 reports results for non-employment.9 As a criterion for inclusion in the sample 
is stable labour force attachment before 1986, thus we can only estimate this outcome from 
1987. Displacement is associated with increased risk for non-employment, for workers 
displaced due to closure as well as the broader group which includes workers from 
downsizing plants. However, the FE estimates are not significant in all years. We cannot 
conclude that the increased non-employment risk is because of displacement and not because 
of unobserved properties, but the results from the earnings regressions suggest that the latter 
is not the case. Table 4 shows the same exercise for months of unemployment.10 OLS 
estimates show an increase in unemployment after displacement. For the largest displacement 
group the effect vanishes in the FE results. This tendency is less clear-cut for workers from 
closing plants. 
 Summing up this part of the analysis, we have found that displacement is followed by 
reduced earnings and unstable employment. Even though selection problems cannot be 
completely ruled out, we find the evidence is quite convincing that these unfavourable 
outcomes are caused by displacement. Reasonably, this evidence of exogeneity is clearest for 
workers who experience that their plants close down.  
 
(Table 5 about here) 
 
Table 5 finally shows results from regressing child outcomes on fathers’ earnings, for 
the full sample and by gender. For each group, the first column shows the intergenerational 
earnings elasticity without the displacement dummy, column 2 introduces the dummy for all 
                                                 
9 As this is a linear probability model, the coefficients may be interpreted directly as marginal effects. 
10 No correction has been made for the large number of zeros. 
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displacement, and column 3 replaces this with the closure dummy. We first note that the 
elasticities are fairly low: 0.12 on average, but only 0.05 for men, and 0.19 for women. Even 
for individuals in their late twenties these are low numbers – Oreopolous et al. report 0.383 
for individuals of comparable age. Several previous Scandinavian studies, like those 
mentioned in the introduction, find small elasticities, however, and our particularly low 
numbers may probably be attributed to the low young age at which the children are observed 
in this study.11 Our main interest is in the displacement dummies, however. As it turns out, 
neither of the displacement dummies has any effect. The elasticities remain unchanged, and 
no estimates of δ are anywhere near being significant.12 This is clearly contrary to Oreopolous 
et al., who find large and significant effects in Canada. One potential explanation for these 
diverging results may be higher female labour force participation in Norway. This will ceteris 
paribus give a smaller effect of reduced income caused by displacement, since men’s earnings 
as share of household income might be smaller in Norway than in Canada. 
 The conclusions in this section are i) that displacement have negative effects on 
earnings and employment, ii) it is possible to argue that these effects are not due to 
unobservables, iii) this exogenous shock has no effects on the earnings of the next generation. 
Thus this study does not provide evidence that family income as a child is an important 
determinant of earnings as an adult. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Bratberg et al. (2005) find somewhat lower elasticities for women but higher for men at age 30 for the 
Norwegian 1965-cohort. In addition to cohort differences the discrepancy may also be due to the conditioning on 
stable workers. 
12 We have checked for nonlinearities by including second and third order terms in fathers’ earnings (see for 
instance the discussion in Solon (1992)). It turns out that a third order polynomial function of fathers’ earnings is 
significant. This is in line with the findings of Bratsberg et al. (2007). More important, it does not affect the 
insignificant results of father’s disclosure on children’s earnings. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
Using matched employer-employee data from Norway, we analyse the effects of worker 
displacement in 1986-87 on children’s earnings and labour force attachment in 1999-2001 for 
more than 47,000 father-child pairs. Seven years after displacement, average earnings of those 
affected are still below their pre-closure earnings. There is also a gap between displaced and 
non-displaced workers in the share of non-employment. However, it turns out that this has no 
discernible effect on their children when they are in their late twenties: regressing an indicator 
of this event, together with fathers’ earnings and other controls, on children’s earnings or non-
employment yields no effect. This result deviates from the findings of Oreopolous et al. 
(2005), who find clear effects using similar Canadian data. Rigorous testing of the differences 
between the two countries is beyond the scope of the present paper. The following heuristic 
arguments might, however, shed some light on these findings: First, our estimate of the 
intergenerational earnings elasticity is low, a fact that may be attributed both to the generally 
high intergenerational earnings mobility in Scandinavia and the relatively young age of which 
the children in our sample are observed.13 Second, as for the (part of the) parent-child 
correlations in earnings that is attributed to parents investments in the offspring’s education, it 
should be noted that education in Norway is free at all levels, and the government provides 
student loans and scholarships with favourable conditions. Thus, financial constraints are less 
important in educational choices. Furthermore, for those who do invest, the returns to 
education in Norway are low compared to most other countries.  
As earlier mentioned, the actual transmission mechanism between generations is not 
well known. In addition to the effect through education, economists realise that there are 
mechanisms that work through “nature and nurture.” For example, it could be the case that an 
                                                 
13 It is well known that earnings at young ages may be poor indicators of lifetime earnings (see for instance 
Haider and Solon 2006, Grawe 2006; Lee and Solon 2006). The children in our sample are on average slightly 
younger than in the sample of Oeropolous et al. 
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employment shock to the family affected the cognitive environment of children or youths and 
thus had a “nurture effect” that could show up at a later age. However, our results do not 
indicate any such effects.  
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 Fathers in 1986 
 Non-displaced All displaced Displaced from closing plant 
    Mean   Std.Dev  Mean   Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
Age 43.0 4.9 42.9 4.9 43.4 4.9 
Earnings 212112 88898 203722 79880 205255 86694 
Education (years) 11.3 3 10.4 2.5 10.4 2.6 
Sector    
Manufacturing 0.35 0.48 0.45 0.5 0.44 0.5 
Electricity 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.1 0.03 0.18 
Construction 0.09 0.28 0.19 0.39 0.13 0.34 
Wholesale 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.32 
Transport 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 
Finance 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.22 0.1 0.3 
Public 0.26 0.44 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.23 
    
Plant size 57.1 119.5 70.8 104.3 38.9 63 
     
N 45089  2052  572  
       
 Children in 2001 
 Mean   Std.Dev  Mean   Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
Age 28.6 1.1 28.6 1.1 28.6 1.1 
Earnings 254525 139143 251891 131271 252630 142342 
Education (years) 12.6 2.9 12.3 2.9 12.1 3.0 
Female 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 
     
N 56367  2486  720  
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Table 2 Effects of displacement on fathers’ log earnings 1982-1994 
All displaced     Displaced from closing plants  
 OLS FE OLS FE
Years since 
displacement
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
-5 0.008 0.010   0.004 0.018   
-4 0.009 0.010 -0.001 0.009 0.001 0.018 -0.001 0.017
-3 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.009 0.008 0.018 0.004 0.017
-2 -0.012 0.009 -0.022 0.009 -0.006 0.018 -0.011 0.017
-1 -0.029 0.009 -0.038 0.009 -0.041 0.018 -0.043 0.017
0 -0.070 0.009 -0.084 0.009 -0.096 0.018 -0.105 0.017
+1 -0.069 0.010 -0.092 0.009 -0.097 0.018 -0.114 0.017
+2 -0.067 0.010 -0.094 0.009 -0.079 0.018 -0.104 0.017
+3 -0.064 0.010 -0.096 0.009 -0.120 0.018 -0.145 0.017
+4 -0.088 0.010 -0.121 0.009 -0.163 0.018 -0.197 0.018
+5 -0.057 0.010 -0.073 0.009 -0.081 0.018 -0.095 0.017
+6 -0.052 0.010 -0.071 0.009 -0.101 0.018 -0.113 0.017
+7 -0.066 0.010 -0.084 0.009 -0.108 0.018 -0.122 0.017
N 47230 
NxT 605658 
Dependent variable is father’s log earnings demeaned by age, year, and pre-displacement industry. Regressors are leads and lags of dummy 
for displacement in 1987. ‘All displaced’ refers to displacement due to plant closure or downsizing. Years = 0 in 1987 
 
 
 
 20
Table 3 Fathers’ non-employment 1987-1994 
 All displaced Displaced from closing plants 
 OLS FE OLS FE
Years since 
displacement
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
0 0.412 0.007 0.324 0.007 0.437 0.013 0.318 0.014
1 0.173 0.007 0.085 0.007 0.220 0.013 0.101 0.014
2 0.117 0.007 0.029 0.007 0.165 0.013 0.046 0.014
3 0.088 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.129 0.013 0.010 0.014
4 0.107 0.007 0.020 0.008 0.156 0.013 0.036 0.014
5 0.087 0.007 -0.001 0.008 0.124 0.013 0.004 0.014
6 0.102 0.007 0.014 0.008 0.135 0.013 0.015 0.014
7 0.096 0.007   0.129 0.013   
N 47230 
NxT 377840 
Linear probability model where dependent variable indicates no valid firm id in current year. Demeaned by age, year, and pre-displacement  
industry. Regressors are lags of dummy for displacement in 1987. ‘All displaced’ refers to displacement due to plant closure or downsizing. 
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Table 4 Fathers’ recorded unemployment 1988-1994 
 All displaced Displaced from closing plants 
 OLS FE OLS FE
Years since 
displacement
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
         
1 0.196 0.023 0.028 0.027 0.347 0.044 0.058 0.050
2 0.177 0.023 0.008 0.027 0.289 0.044 -0.003 0.051
3 0.166 0.023 -0.002 0.027 0.319 0.044 0.027 0.051
4 0.191 0.023 0.022 0.027 0.422 0.044 0.128 0.051
5 0.149 0.023 -0.022 0.027 0.286 0.044 -0.008 0.051
6 0.128 0.023 -0.042 0.027 0.304 0.044 0.009 0.051
7 0.175 0.023   0.294 0.044   
N 47230 
NxT 330610 
Dependent variable is months of recorded unemployment in current year. Demeaned by age, year, and pre-displacement industry.  
Regressors are lags of dummy for displacement in 1987. ‘All displaced’ refers to displacement due to plant closure or downsizing. 
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Table 5 Effects of fathers’ displacement and log earnings 1982-1985 on children’s average log earnings 1999-2001 
 All   Men   Women   
Father’s log 
earnings 
0.118 
[0.015] 
0.118 
[0.015] 
0.118 
[0.015] 
0.052 
[0.020] 
0.053 
[0.020] 
0.053 
[0.020] 
0.187 
[0.023] 
0.187 
[0.023] 
0.188 
[0.023] 
Father 
displaced due 
to downsizing 
or closure 
- -0.004 
[0.019] 
- - 0.003 
[0.023] 
- - -0.011 
[0.031] 
- 
Father 
displaced due 
to closure 
- - -0.012 
[0.034] 
- - 0.031 
[0.040] 
- - -0.065 
[0.057] 
N 58853 30397 28456 
Standard errors in brackets. Age adjusted earnings measures. Controlled for father’s industry in 1986 and child’s cohort (1971-1974)  
 
Norges
Handelshøyskole
Norwegian School of Economics 
and Business Administration
NHH
Helleveien 30
NO-5045 Bergen
Norway
Tlf/Tel: +47 55 95 90 00
Faks/Fax: +47 55 95 91 00
nhh.postmottak@nhh.no
www.nhh.no
